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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Just because a statute may be unconstitutional does not 
mean that a federal court may declare it so. If there is no real 
dispute over a statute’s scope or enforceability, we must dis-
miss any suit attacking it, no matter how obvious the result may 
seem. 
A group of public-school teachers challenged a Pennsylva-
nia statute that authorizes their local unions to deduct fees from 
their paychecks even though they do not belong to the union. 
After the Supreme Court invalidated another state’s similar 
statute, the parties all agreed that Pennsylvania’s law was un-
enforceable too. 
The District Court correctly held that this development 
mooted this case. The parties no longer dispute whether the 
statute is enforceable, and there is no reason to think that any-
one will try to collect agency fees from these teachers again. If 
4 
a court is to formally declare the statute unconstitutional, that 
will have to await a future case in which the parties earnestly 
dispute its validity. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legal background 
Some public-sector employees join their local unions; oth-
ers choose not to. Even so, if a collective-bargaining agreement 
contains an “agency-fee” provision, both union members and 
nonmembers must pay a portion of union dues. See, e.g., Har-
ris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 624 (2014). A Pennsylvania statute 
authorizes this practice as a “fair share fee” arrangement. 71 
Pa. Stat. § 575(b). Nonmembers need not pay full union dues, 
but only the amount spent on the union’s collective-bargaining 
activities. Id. § 575(a). Thus, they do not have to subsidize lob-
bying or other political activity. 
For four decades, this setup was permissible under the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). In Abood, public-school teachers 
successfully challenged a law that forced nonmembers to pay 
full dues. Id. at 212–13, 235–36. The Supreme Court agreed 
that the First Amendment protected them from having to sub-
sidize the union’s political activities “unrelated to its duties as 
exclusive bargaining representative.” Id. at 234. But it held that 
the government could still require nonmembers to subsidize 
public-sector union expenses related to collective bargaining, 
administering contracts, and handling grievances. Id. at 232. 
Dissatisfied with Abood’s compromise, public-sector em-
ployees who chose not to join unions kept bringing First 
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Amendment challenges. Eventually, they succeeded. In 2018, 
the Supreme Court overruled Abood in Janus v. AFSCME, 
Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). In Janus, the Court held 
that forcing nonmembers to pay agency fees violates the First 
Amendment, even if those fees go toward collective bargain-
ing. Id. at 2486. It thus struck down an Illinois statute allowing 
collection of agency fees. See id. at 2460–61. Though Janus 
said nothing about Pennsylvania law, its holding was clear: 
“States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency 
fees from nonconsenting employees.” Id. at 2486. 
B. Procedural background 
This action began in the runup to Janus. Appellants are four 
public-school teachers who did not belong to a union but had 
to pay agency fees under Pennsylvania law. They sued their 
school districts, superintendents, and teachers’ unions, though 
only the unions remain as appellees. The teachers sought a dec-
laration that the agency-fee provisions in their collective-bar-
gaining agreements, as well as the Pennsylvania statutes au-
thorizing them, were unconstitutional. They also sought an in-
junction requiring the unions to delete the agency-fee provi-
sions from the collective-bargaining agreements and banning 
them from future agreements. Though the teachers had at first 
sought nominal damages too, the defendants paid each teacher 
$100 to satisfy those claims.  
After the Supreme Court decided Janus, the unions did not 
try to salvage their agency-fee setup. Indeed, the very day the 
Supreme Court issued its decision, the Pennsylvania State Ed-
ucation Association notified public schools of the decision and 
told them to stop deducting agency fees from teachers’ 
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paychecks. It also set up procedures to refund all agency fees 
collected during or attributable to the period after Janus. And 
at the state level, Pennsylvania’s Department of Labor and its 
Office of Attorney General notified public-sector employers 
that they could no longer collect agency fees. 
The teachers moved for summary judgment based on Ja-
nus. In response, the unions argued that the change in the law 
and their compliance with it had mooted the case. The District 
Court agreed that the case had become moot and dismissed it. 
Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. Ass’n, 390 F. Supp. 3d 592, 602 
(M.D. Pa. 2019). The teachers now appeal. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
Whether or not the case is moot, we have jurisdiction under 
§ 1291. We review the District Court’s factual findings for 
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Freedom from 
Religion Found. Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 
F.3d 469, 475 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016). 
II. THIS CASE IS MOOT 
A. Mootness principles 
1. Standing and mootness allocate different jurisdictional 
burdens. Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over 
“Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
Thus, federal courts can entertain actions only if they present 
live disputes, ones in which both sides have a personal stake. 
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). 
At the start of litigation, the burden rests on the plaintiff, “as 
the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” to show its standing to 
sue. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). That 
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requires showing injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 
Id. But once the plaintiff shows standing at the outset, she need 
not keep doing so throughout the lawsuit. 
Instead, the burden shifts. If the defendant (or any party) 
claims that some development has mooted the case, it bears 
“[t]he ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court” that there is 
no longer a live controversy. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) 
(quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 
393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). In other words, mootness is not just 
“the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.” Id. at 189–90 
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 
43, 68 n.22 (1997)). Standing and mootness are “two distinct 
justiciability doctrines.” Freedom from Religion Found., 832 
F.3d at 475–76. So sometimes a suit filed on Monday will be 
able to proceed even if, because of a development on Tuesday, 
the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing if it 
had been filed on Wednesday. The Tuesday development does 
not necessarily moot the suit. 
2. Voluntary cessation does not always trigger mootness. 
One scenario in which we are reluctant to declare a case moot 
is when the defendant argues mootness because of some action 
it took unilaterally after the litigation began. This situation is 
often called “[v]oluntary cessation,” and it “will moot a case 
only if it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behav-
ior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” Fields v. 
Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142, 
161 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007)). When a 
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plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a defendant arguing mootness 
must show that there is no reasonable likelihood that a declar-
atory judgment would affect the parties’ future conduct. See, 
e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam); 
United States v. Gov’t of the V.I., 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
Voluntary cessation cases highlight the important differ-
ence between standing (at the start of a suit) and mootness 
(mid-suit). The shift in the burden of proof from plaintiff to 
defendant matters. It means that sometimes, “the prospect that 
a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may 
be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative 
to overcome mootness.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. 
While the case law speaks largely of voluntary cessation, 
these principles apply even when the defendant’s cessation is 
not entirely voluntary. Take Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 
F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). The City of Albuquerque had for-
bidden sex offenders to use public libraries. Id. at 1116. An 
affected sex offender sued and won an injunction, so the City 
started letting sex offenders use its libraries. Id. at 1117 & n.5. 
But that did not moot the case. Though the City had complied 
for the time being, it “forcefully maintained the constitutional-
ity of the enjoined [policy]” and planned to reinstate it in the 
future. Id. at 1117 n.5; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 
F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). Yet if the City’s attitude had been 
different, the answer to the mootness question could well have 
differed too. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 310. What was important 
was whether the City could reasonably be expected to engage 
in the challenged behavior again. Friends of the Earth, 528 
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U.S. at 189. That is always the key question, no matter why the 
defendant ceased its behavior. 
To be sure, the defendant’s reason for changing its behavior 
is often probative of whether it is likely to change its behavior 
again. We will understandably be skeptical of a claim of moot-
ness when a defendant yields in the face of a court order and 
assures us that the case is moot because the injury will not re-
cur, yet maintains that its conduct was lawful all along. See 
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012); see also 
13C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.5, at 248 (3d 
ed. 2008). On the other hand, if the defendant ceases because 
of a new statute or a ruling in a completely different case, its 
argument for mootness is much stronger. See, e.g., Lighthouse 
Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
260 (3d Cir. 2007); Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., 
L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.). 
In short, the touchstone of the voluntary-cessation doctrine 
is not how willingly the defendant changed course. Rather, the 
focus is on whether the defendant made that change unilater-
ally and so may “return to [its] old ways” later on. Friends of 
the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Alad-
din’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 (1982)). Perhaps it 
would be more accurate to call it the volitional-cessation doc-
trine. 
Though voluntary or volitional cessation is often described 
as an exception to mootness, that is not quite right. The burden 
always lies on the party claiming mootness, whether the case 
involves voluntary cessation or not. See Friends of the Earth, 
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528 U.S. at 189. Voluntary cessation is just a recurring situa-
tion in which courts are particularly skeptical of mootness ar-
guments. That is why, in voluntary-cessation cases, defend-
ants’ burden of showing mootness is heavy. Id. 
B. This case is moot because there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the unions will seek to collect agency 
fees in the future 
The facts here present an especially strong case of mootness 
by voluntary cessation. Until Janus, the unions had every rea-
son to believe, under Abood, that they could collect agency fees 
from nonmembers. Once the Supreme Court changed course in 
Janus, the unions immediately stopped collecting agency fees. 
And since Janus, they have conceded that Pennsylvania’s 
agency-fee arrangement violates the First Amendment and 
have forsworn collecting fees from nonmembers. So we see no 
reasonable likelihood that the unions will try to collect agency 
fees from the teachers ever again. Cf. Knox, 567 U.S. at 307–
08 (finding a similar challenge not moot because the defendant 
union insisted that agency fees were constitutional). Thus, the 
unions have borne their “formidable burden of showing that it 
is absolutely clear [that] the allegedly wrongful behavior could 
not reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 
U.S. at 190. 
In response, the teachers cite other unions’ collective-bar-
gaining agreements that have, even after Janus, included 
agency-fee language. We are unmoved. For one, the mootness 
inquiry focuses on the parties before us. A court can enter a 
declaratory judgment “if, and only if, it affects the behavior of 
the defendant toward the plaintiff.” Rhodes, 488 U.S. at 4 (per 
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curiam). And the mere presence of language in contracts 
causes no harm. The teachers neither show nor even allege that 
any public-sector union in Pennsylvania has tried to enforce 
those provisions since Janus. 
C. Decisions allowing other constitutional challenges 
to go forward are irrelevant 
In trying to salvage this litigation, the teachers cite other 
constitutional challenges that have proceeded even after a land-
mark Supreme Court decision changed the lay of the land. 
They take this as evidence that a challenge to a state’s statute 
necessarily survives the invalidation of another state’s equiva-
lent. But our mootness inquiry is not guided by broad rules like 
this one; it depends on the particular facts of each case. And 
the cases they invoke are inapposite.  
For instance, the teachers note that even after the Supreme 
Court decided Citizens United, lower courts kept striking down 
campaign-finance statutes whose unconstitutionality had be-
come clear. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 
(2010). But that was a complex decision striking down a spe-
cific set of federal campaign-finance laws. So it is no surprise 
that there were still open questions about how it applied to 
many federal, state, and local campaign-finance rules. Indeed, 
it does not appear that the litigants even suggested mootness in 
the post-Citizens United cases cited by the teachers.  
Here, however, no one questions whether public-sector un-
ions can still collect agency fees from nonmembers. It is sim-
ple: agency-fee arrangements were allowed by Abood, then 
banned by Janus. Neither party has advanced any reason why 
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the Pennsylvania law might escape Janus’s broad holding that 
“public-sector agency-shop arrangements violate the First 
Amendment” and thus that “States and public-sector unions 
may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting em-
ployees.” 138 S. Ct. at 2478, 2486. 
The teachers also cite challenges to laws related to same-
sex marriage after Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015). But the main case they cite went beyond Obergefell, 
addressing not just whether same-sex couples could marry but 
whether states had to afford them all the incidental benefits of 
marriage. See Waters v. Ricketts, 798 F.3d 682, 685–86 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (per curiam). That case noted that Obergefell had 
not spoken to the validity of all marriage-benefits laws. Id. By 
contrast, Janus declared unequivocally that collecting agency 
fees from nonmembers is unconstitutional, and we see no lin-
gering subsidiary questions. See 138 S. Ct. at 2478, 2486. At 
the very least, none are presented here. 
D. Because this case no longer presents a live 
controversy, the District Court was correct to 
dismiss it  
Finally, the teachers argue that dismissal for mootness was 
not the right disposition. According to them, once the parties 
agreed that the challenged statutes were unconstitutional and 
that there were no more factual disputes, the District Court 
should have declared the Pennsylvania statute unconstitu-
tional.  
Not so. The lack of any disagreement between the parties 
over the facts or the law, and the lack of any continuing injury 
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to the teachers, is precisely what makes the case moot. And 
once that happens, any declaratory judgment would be an ad-
visory opinion. 
The teachers thus err in insisting that the case remains alive 
because a court could still grant them “effectual relief.” Appel-
lants’ Br. 14 (quoting Knox, 567 U.S. at 307). A live contro-
versy requires not only the possibility of awarding relief, but 
also a real dispute between the parties about the facts or the 
law. There is no such dispute here. 
We understand that the teachers might rest more easily if a 
court declared 71 Pa. Stat. § 575(b) unconstitutional. But the 
federal courts are not “roving commissions” charged with 
scrubbing invalid laws from the statute books. Broadrick v. Ok-
lahoma, 413 U.S. 610, 610–11 (1973). Instead, we will await a 
case where the parties earnestly dispute the validity or enforce-
ability of Pennsylvania’s agency-fee statute. Because this is not 
that case, there was nothing for the District Court to do other 
than dismiss it as moot. It correctly did so. 
* * * * * 
It may seem odd that unconstitutional laws remain on the 
books. But until a party faces a real threat of enforcement, a 
statute is mere words on a page, and federal courts cannot opine 
on its validity. 
At the start of this suit, the teachers faced ongoing harm 
from the unions’ collection of agency fees. That got them 
through the courthouse doors. But once the Supreme Court 
made clear that public-sector agency fees are unconstitutional, 
the unions emphatically disclaimed any intent to enforce the 
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challenged statute. Because the teachers have nothing to fear, 
we will affirm.  
